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Abstract
Following the announcement on August 9, 2007, by BNP Paribas that it was suspending
redemptions for three of its open-end investment funds that had invested heavily in
mortgage-backed securities, liquidity in the American interbank and short-term funding
markets tightened considerably. On August 17, the Federal Reserve lowered the cost of
borrowing from the discount window. However, usage remained low, due largely to the
perception that such borrowing implied weak financials. In December, the Fed launched the
Term Auction Facility (TAF), which used single-rate auctions to mitigate this stigma. The TAF
offered discount-window credit of 28 days, and later, 84 days. Although the TAF avoided the
stigma of the discount window, it relied heavily on the discount window’s infrastructure, and
the same banks were eligible for both programs. Foreign banks could access TAF funds via
their US branches or subsidiaries and ultimately accounted for about two-thirds of the
program’s usage. The TAF provided USD 493 billion at its peak in March 2009 and was one
of the Fed’s most-used programs during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09. A rich body
of literature mostly concludes that the TAF reduced interbank funding stress.
Keywords: Discount window, Federal Reserve, interbank funds market, liquidity risk
premium, TAF
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Overview
On August 9, 2007, BNP Paribas, France’s
largest bank, suspended redemptions on
three investment funds because it was
temporarily unable to value the private-label
mortgage-backed securities that they held
(BNP Paribas 2007). Many other banks and
asset managers sustained losses in privatelabel mortgage-backed securities, and
spreads between secured and unsecured
overnight
funding
spiked,
stressing
America’s interbank funding market (Taylor
and Williams 2009). Around the world,
central banks provided large amounts of
liquidity to quell the crisis (Borio and Nelson
2008). In the US, the Federal Reserve Board
lowered the rate for primary credit4 at the
discount
window—its
main
lending
channel—from 6.25% to 5.75% on August 17
(Fed 2007). In doing so, the Fed reduced the
spread between its primary credit rate and
the targeted federal funds rate from 100 to 50
basis points, effectively halving the interest
rate penalty for discount-window borrowing
(FOMC and Fed 2007a). On August 16, the
Federal Reserve Board also extended the
maximum term on discount-window loans to
30 days, rather than the traditional overnight
term. Despite these actions, discountwindow usage lagged behind that of similar
facilities at other major central banks (Borio
and Nelson 2008; Armantier, Krieger, and
McAndrews 2008). In the US, market
observers historically considered discountwindow loans a sign of weak balance sheets
and efforts to keep borrowing confidential

Key Terms
Purpose: “to provide liquidity that would help
normalize money markets, particularly term money
markets, and would allow banks to make use of the
enormous amount of collateral they have at the
discount window, but would avoid the stigma”
(FOMC and Fed 2007b)
Launch Dates

Announcement:
December 12, 2007
First settlement:
December 20, 2007

Expiration Dates

Last settlement: March
11, 2010
Last maturity: April 8,
2010

Legal Authority

FRA §10(B)

Peak Outstanding

USD 493 billion in
March 2009

Participants

US banks and US
branches of foreign
banks eligible for
primary credit

Rate

Single-price auction

Collateral

Discount-window
eligible/
overcollateralization

Loan Duration

28-day or 84-day

Notable Features

Program designed to
combat discountwindow stigma

Outcomes

All loans repaid

The discount window offered banks three different types of credit—primary, secondary, and seasonal—
depending on their financial soundness. Primary credit was available to generally sound institutions and
carried a rate of 100 basis points (bps) above the Federal Open Market Committee’s target rate for federal funds
prior to the Global Financial Crisis. Secondary credit, which required a greater degree of administration and
carried a rate 50bps higher than primary credit, was available to banks considered too risky for primary credit.
Seasonal credit offered credit to banks with seasonal variation in liquidity, such as those with clients
concentrated in agriculture or tourism (Armantier, Krieger, and McAndrews 2008; Gilbert et al. 2012).
4
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were inadequate (Duke 2010; Armantier et al. 2015; 2011).
In response to continued stress in the interbank market, on December 12, 2007, the Fed
announced its first program of what would become the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (Fed
2007b). The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was the result of the Fed’s efforts to provide
discount-window funding to banks without stigmatizing borrowers (FOMC and Fed 2007b).
The auction mitigated stigma by increasing the number of borrowers and tweaking features
of the discount window that facilitated adverse selection. The TAF allowed a bank to bid
through its local Federal Reserve bank for a loan at an interest rate determined by auction
(Fed 2009a). The TAF “inject[ed] term funds through a broader range of counterparties and
against a broader range of collateral than open market operations,” which were only
available to primary dealers (Fed 2007b).
The Federal Reserve Board authorized the TAF on December 10, 2007, under section 10B of
the Federal Reserve Act (FOMC and Fed 2007d). Section 10B empowered the Reserve Banks
to make a secured loan of not more than four months to a member bank, consistent with
rules and regulations enacted by the Board, and as long as the loan was “secured to the
satisfaction” of the lending Reserve Bank (Federal Reserve Act 1913, vol. 12, sec. 10B).5
The Fed relied on much of the discount window’s infrastructure for the TAF, and the program
originally shared many characteristics with the discount window. TAF loans were offered to
depository institutions against the same wide set of collateral that the discount window
accepted. And all banks that were eligible for primary credit at the discount window were
eligible for the TAF, subject to local Reserve Bank scrutiny (Fed 2007b).
However, some TAF terms were distinct from the discount window. For example, most
discount-window loans were overnight, although the Fed had introduced 30-day discountwindow loans in August 2007 at the beginning of the crisis and 90-day loans in March 2008
after the failure of Bear Stearns. TAF loans were initially for 28 days; an 84-day loan was
added in July 2008. Longer maturities gave borrowers more options and helped ease stress
on interbank markets. The TAF also prohibited early repayment of loans, which the discount
window allowed for term loans (Fed 2006).
With the longer lending terms, the Fed introduced an additional collateral cushion beyond
what its haircut schedule specified. This cushion was initially equal to 100% of the value of
collateral after haircuts were applied, effectively doubling the amount of collateral
borrowers needed, but, in July 2008, the Fed reduced the size of the collateral cushion to
33% (FOMC and Fed 2008b; Fed 2008a).
The TAF auctioned a preannounced amount using a single-rate mechanism. Prospective
borrowers submitted bids through their local Federal Reserve bank. They requested an
amount of funds and offered a rate they would pay. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
Many other programs implemented by the Fed to address the GFC were implemented under its emergency
lending authority, which required the Fed to demonstrate “unusual and exigent” circumstances (Federal
Reserve Act 1913, vol. 12, sec. 13[3]). Since the TAF was an exercise of the Fed’s core lender-of-last-resort
function, it was not required to meet such a standard.
5
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which managed the auctions, charged the stop-out rate—just low enough that the amounts
requested by bids above that rate exhausted the amount offered—to bidders whose bids
were higher than or equal to the stop-out rate and an announced minimum bid rate (Fed
2007b). Bid sizes were subject to a preannounced minimum bid level (originally USD 10
million) and a maximum bid level (10% of the auction amount).
The Fed conducted 60 auctions between December 20, 2007, and March 11, 2010. Until
September 2008, the Fed offered between USD 20 billion and USD 75 billion per auction.
When Lehman Brothers collapsed on September 15, 2008, interbank funding spreads spiked
to their highest levels during the GFC. The Fed offered USD 150 billion in each of the following
22 auctions, providing enough liquidity to satisfy all demand. As a result, the TAF functioned
like a standing facility since bids consistently settled at the minimum bid rate. Figure 1
depicts TAF operations, their ultimate sizes, and the bid-cover ratio, which measures total
bids as a percentage of the amount offered. Outstanding TAF funds peaked at USD 493 billion
in March 2009 and the aggregate amount lent under the program totaled USD 3.8 trillion
(Government Accountability Office 2011; Fed 2007–2010a).
Foreign banks, which faced acute dollar funding pressures due to lost returns on dollardenominated mortgage products and other interbank funding pressures inextricable from
US markets, accessed TAF funding through their US branches, which were eligible for the
discount window and, thus, also for the TAF (Bernanke 2015, 185). American branches of
foreign banks borrowed a large amount from the TAF, approximately two-thirds of the total,
or USD 2.5 trillion in aggregate over time (Government Accountability Office 2011; Fed
2007–2010a). Foreign banks also accessed dollar liquidity through foreign central banks
that participated in the Fed’s swap lines; these swap lines, in turn, sometimes coordinated
the timing and pricing of US dollar funds with TAF operations (Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu
2011).
Early discussions of the TAF left open the possibility that it could become a permanent
facility (Mishkin 2008; FOMC and Fed 2007c). However, by December 2008, FOMC
transcripts show that members were anxious about the growing size of the Fed’s balance
sheet (FOMC and Fed 2008d). By summer 2009, bids had decreased but still totaled more
than USD 10 billion per auction (Fed and Runkel 2007–2010b). The Fed decided to phase out
first the 84-day auctions and then, on March 8, 2010, 28-day auctions (FOMC 2010). The Fed
suffered no losses on TAF loans.
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Figure 1: Term Auction Facility Operations

Source: Fed and Runkel 2007–2010b.

Summary Evaluation
The Fed designed the TAF as a lending facility that banks could use for term loans without
incurring the discount-window stigma. Its critical feature was that it determined the interest
rate through a single-rate auction. Most analysts concluded that the Fed achieved its goal.
TAF lending was substantial and far outpaced discount-window lending during the crisis,
although the latter did increase despite the perceived stigma (Gilbert et al. 2012, 228–29).
For the first three months of the program, TAF borrowing was cheaper than discountwindow borrowing. But, after the Fed lowered the costs of discount-window borrowing in
March 2008, many banks that were eligible for both were still willing to borrow from the
TAF at a premium rather than use the discount window (Armantier et al. 2011). This is
illustrated in Figure 2, which shows that, prior to the Lehman bankruptcy in September
2008, the TAF stop-out rate was usually higher than the discount rate.
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Figure 2: Percentage of Banks Bidding above the Discount Window Rate at TAF
Auctions

Note: On March 16, 2008, the Fed narrowed the spread of the primary credit rate over the target federal funds
rate to 25bps.
Source: Armantier et al. 2011.

The Fed was successful in managing the risks associated with crisis lending, reporting no
losses (Government Accountability Office 2011). Its risk-management measures—the
solvency requirement for participants, the haircuts, the collateral cushion, and the seniority
of Federal Reserve credit—protected the central bank from counterparty risk throughout
the program’s duration (Carlson, Duygan-Bump, and Nelson 2015).
But academic studies disagree on how the TAF affected the interbank term loan rate,
specifically its credit-risk and liquidity-risk premia. Taylor and Williams (2009) used an
arbitrage-free model that regressed the LIBOR-OIS spread on several explanatory variables.
They found no evidence that the TAF significantly affected the liquidity premium.
McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2017) argue that Taylor and Williams’ results were invalid
since they considered only the absolute level of the LIBOR-OIS spread. By using the change
in that spread, McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang found that the TAF significantly lowered the
liquidity premium.
Christensen, Lopez, and Rudebusch (2009) obtain similar results to McAndrews, Sarkar, and
Wang using a completely different method. Instead of constructing a linear regression model,
Christensen, Lopez, and Rudebusch construct a six-factor arbitrage-free model for
decomposing Treasury, bond, and LIBOR yields. Their tests concluded that yields decreased
after December 2007, when the TAF made its debut. A counterfactual simulation also found
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that the three-month LIBOR rate would have been 70 basis points higher than the observed
rate if the Fed had not introduced the emergency liquidity measures.
It is uncertain whether the Fed could use the TAF in a similar future crisis. Fed officials
thought that the TAF could help diminish stigma because each bank would pay the marketdetermined rate, not a penalty rate. Also, with many banks participating, it would be less
likely that others in the market could guess which banks had participated. However,
regulations enacted after the GFC required the Fed to disclose borrower-level data one year
after a facility’s closure, potentially making banks less willing to participate (Dodd-Frank Act
2010, sec. 1103[b]). And, after the Fed released TAF borrower data in 2011, there were some
critical reports regarding the fact that US branches of foreign banks borrowed 65% of TAF
funds (Government Accountability Office 2011; Fed 2007–2010a). Meanwhile, the Fed also
made discount-window borrowing harder to trace by combining discount-window loan
amounts with other liabilities of banks and non-financial institutions at the Reserve-Bank
level. These factors may lessen the value of an auction facility over the discount window.
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Context: United States 2007–2008

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

USD 14,681.5 billion in 2007
USD 14,559.5 billion in 2008
USD 47,976 in 2007
USD 48,383 in 2008

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

As of Q4, 2007:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
USD 9,231.7 billion in total assets in
2007
USD 9,938.3 billion in total assets in
2008
62.9% in 2007
68.3% in 2008
29.0% of financial system assets in
2007
30.5% of financial system assets in
2008
43.9% of assets in 2007
44.9% of assets in 2008
22% of assets in 2007
18% of assets in 2008
0% of banks owned by the state in
2008
100% insurance on deposits up to
USD 100,000 for 2007
100% insurance on deposits up to
USD 250,000 for 2008

Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The Fed designed the TAF to provide domestic and foreign banks with
liquidity through a fixed-price auction while circumventing the stigma associated
with discount-window borrowing.
At its September 2007 meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) discussed a
staff proposal to create an auction-based facility to overcome banks’ reluctance to use the
discount window. They also recognized the possibility of creating currency swap lines with
foreign central banks to channel dollars overseas to foreign banks with significant US dollar
exposures, particularly in mortgage-related assets. FOMC participants expressed the
concern that funding liquidity “appears genuinely to be a scarce valuable commodity,” even
as banks’ borrowing from the discount window remained limited (FOMC and Fed 2007b).
The Board understood that financial institutions had turned instead to the Federal Home
Loan Banks6 (FHLB) for funding, due to the lower cost, longer terms, and lack of stigma of
FHLB advances. Some FOMC participants expressed skepticism that an auction would
effectively reduce stigma (FOMC and Fed 2007b).
The TAF’s advantage was that it targeted “direct credit to a market that [wa]sn’t working”
rather than pumping up credit to the macroeconomy (FOMC and Fed 2007b). Federal
Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke also wanted the TAF to address the interbank market’s inability
or unwillingness to price risks, but other FOMC participants expressed skepticism that it
could achieve this goal. He argued that encouraging loans against the TAF’s wide set of
collateral was “totally consistent with Bagehot and the traditions of central bank lending”
because it was lending against “undervalued, hard-to-sell, or illiquid assets” that were
nonetheless valuable collateral (FOMC and Fed 2007b).
The driving forces behind the TAF were also closely connected to the creation of US dollar
swap lines, which are discussed further in Key Design Decision Error! Reference source
not found.. Chair Bernanke noted that “there seems to be an interest from our international
partners in working with us with the swap, with activities in other countries, and this TAF
seems to be the thing that makes them eager to participate” (FOMC and Fed 2007c). And
when the Fed decided in September 2007 to table discussion of the TAF, it was “in light of
the ECB’s diffidence” as well as “modest improvements we were seeing in money market
functioning,” (Bernanke 2015, p. 163). But financial stress resumed in the fall, and the Fed
revived discussion of the TAF. When the Board ultimately voted to create the TAF on
December 12, 2007, it did so for the same reasons as it had discussed it in September: “to
address elevated pressures in short-term funding markets” (Fed 2007b). The announcement
also mentioned that the TAF might help “a broader range of counterparties” than its openmarket operations with primary dealers would (Fed 2007b).

Like the Federal Reserve banks, the 12 FHLBs served banks within their geographic region and lent primarily
against home mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, and US government securities to support the mortgage
market (see Leonard 2022).
6
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2. Legal Authority: The Federal Reserve Board relied on its authority under section
10B of the Federal Reserve Act for the TAF.
The Fed created the TAF under section 10B of the Federal Reserve Act (1913), which
provides authority for Federal Reserve banks to lend to member banks, consistent with
enacted rules and regulations, provided that the Federal Reserve bank was “secured to its
satisfaction.”
To authorize the use of an auction, the Board voted on December 7, 2007, to amend
Regulation A, the federal regulation that established rules for Federal Reserve bank credit.
Among other things, this amendment allowed the Board of Governors to set auction rules
and set the interest rate on TAF funds as the result of that auction (Fed 2007a). This
amendment was necessary because Reserve Banks technically held authority to set their
own lending rates, subject to review and approval by the Board of Governors (FOMC and Fed
2007b; FOMC and Fed 2007d). For the same reason, every change in the primary and
secondary credit rates required approval by the Board.
3. Part of a Package: The Fed announced the TAF alongside US Dollar swap
agreements and changed its terms at the same time as other Fed facilities.
When the Fed implemented the TAF in December 2007, it was responding to a financial crisis
that had already infected the international financial system. Foreign banks’ dollar funding
needs exceeded USD 1 trillion due to their substantial cross-currency financial activities
before the crisis, particularly in US mortgage-related assets. A contraction in the US
interbank market further strained foreign banks (Fender and McGuire 2010; Bernanke 2015,
chap. 9). In September 2007, when the Board and FOMC first considered the staff’s proposal
for an auction facility to address US market strains, they also discussed how best to get
“dollars into European dollar markets” (FOMC and Fed 2007b). Chair Bernanke floated the
notion of combining solutions to the two problems at a September joint meeting of the FOMC,
which had authority over swaps and the Board:
Some conversations that I had, in particular with President Trichet of the European
Central Bank [ECB], came up with the possibility of combining these two things,
essentially having auctions simultaneously in the United States and in Europe, and then
using the swap markets to provide the dollars to the extent that the ECB would like to
have them. The Swiss National Bank [SNB] expressed interest in joining this as well.
(FOMC and Fed 2007b)
As a result of further discussions, on the same December day that it announced the TAF, the
Fed also announced new swap agreements with the ECB and SNB. Under the agreements,
these central banks could swap their respective currency for an equivalent amount of US
dollars, returning the same amount of dollars at a predetermined future date. The central
banks then auctioned funds to banks in their respective jurisdictions (FOMC and Fed 2008b).
Keeping with the idea that swap lines were a “package deal” dependent on the Fed adopting
the TAF, the ECB and SNB coordinated their dollar funding operations with the Fed (FOMC
and Fed 2007c). The two central banks offered US dollars the day after TAF auctions, with
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settlement on the same day as TAF settlements and for the same maturities. As shown in
Figure 3, both the TAF and the US dollar swap lines were significant components of the Fed’s
response to the GFC (see Wiggins and Metrick 2020). In fall 2008, the Fed added swap
agreements with other central banks; eventually the Fed had agreements with 14 central
banks. In total, borrowings under the 14 swaps reached a peak of USD 695 billion on October
21, 2008, although the Fed had also committed to providing unlimited dollar liquidity to the
ECB, SNB, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan (Wiggins and Metrick 2020).
Some of the swap counterparties also offered US dollar lending on the same days as TAF
auctions (Wiggins and Metrick 2020). The ECB, SNB, Norges Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the
Bank of Korea conducted swaps with settlement and maturity dates that matched 48 TAF
operations (Fed 2007–2010c; Fed and Runkel 2007–2010b). Coordination extended to
policy changes; when the TAF introduced 84-day loans, the ECB and SNB also introduced 84day terms to their dollar-liquidity auctions (FOMC and Fed 2008b). The ECB sometimes
charged participants a rate equal to the stop-out rate in TAF auctions, provided by the FRBNY
before it was announced publicly (Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu 2011; Fed and Runkel 2007–
2010b; ECB 2021). When the coordination factors are considered in aggregate, the
connection between the TAF and these auctions is clear. For example, on November 18, 2008,
outstanding swap agreements with settlement and maturity dates matching those of TAF
operations totaled USD 445 billion, rivaling the size of the TAF (Fed 2007–2010c; Fed and
Runkel 2007–2010b).
However, it is important to acknowledge the different trajectories of the two programs. Any
such coordination of actions was decided by the foreign central bank and not dictated by the
Federal Reserve. Moreover, swap usage became less correlated with TAF operations over
time (Fed 2007c; Fed 2007–2010c; Fed and Runkel 2007–2010b).
The Fed sometimes announced changes to domestic programs when it changed the TAF, but
the changes did not interact with the TAF in the way that the swap lines did. These changes
included rate cuts when the program was announced in 2007 and a slew of programs around
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in fall 2008.
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Figure 3: Federal Reserve System Credit Allocation During the GFC

Sources: Author’s calculation; Fed 2007c.

4. Management: Federal Reserve banks loaned funds to counterparties located in
their respective districts.
The TAF was authorized by the Fed Board and any changes to it other than purely
operational matters, such as the introduction of 84-day credit, were also approved by the
Board (Fed 2007b; Fed 2008f). Management of the TAF was split between the Board of
Governors and the 12 Federal Reserve banks. Before each auction, the Board announced the
amount offered, minimum bid rate, and other terms. Participants bid through their local
Federal Reserve bank, which then sent the bids to the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York to be compiled and accepted (Fed 2008a). Disbursements were made
through the local Reserve banks.
5. Administration: The Fed awarded TAF funds using a single-price auction and
repurposed existing discount-window infrastructure for its administration.
The TAF auction process typically lasted a whole week; one FOMC participant noted that this
extended timeline helped address the stigma problem, saying, “If you have to submit your
bid on Monday to get awarded on Thursday, this is not the action of a bank that’s desperate
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for funding” (FOMC and Fed 2007b). A typical Friday started with the Board of Governors
announcing the amount offered, minimum rate, and terms (Fed 2008a).
On Monday, participants then called their local Federal Reserve bank’s discount-window
hotline to place bids, which were then relayed to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The
New York team calculated the stop-out rate by accepting bids starting with those offering
the highest interest rate, then the next highest rate, and so on, until either the accepted bid
amounts exhausted the amount offered, or bid rates dropped below the minimum rate (Fed
2008a). The lowest accepted bid was the stop-out rate, paid by all bidders (Fed 2009a).
On Tuesday, the Fed announced the results of the auction, notified the successful bidders,
and, on Thursday, Reserve Banks credited the accounts of successful bidders to settle
(Armantier, Krieger, and McAndrews 2008; Fed 2009a). When loans matured, either 28 or
84 days after settlement, the borrower paid the stop-out rate as interest (Fed 2009a).
Before and after the auction, the TAF relied on the existing discount-window infrastructure.
Discount-window staff were already in place to screen collateral, and the Reserve Banks had
prior relationships with the banks in their district (FOMC and Fed 2007b). Participating
banks agreed to the same borrowing terms, under Operating Circular 10 (OC-10), that were
required for discount-window borrowing (Fed 2009a). By using much of the discountwindow infrastructure, the Fed sought to make the program “simple” to counterparties
facing a new facility yet “robust” enough for reliable operations of large loan amounts (FOMC
and Fed 2007b).
Figure 4: Sample Auction Results
Date
8/25/2008
9/8/2008
9/9/2008
9/22/2008
10/6/2008
10/20/2008
11/3/2008

Term
(days)

Amount
offered

28
USD 75 billion
84
USD 25 billion
28
USD 25 billion
28
USD 75 billion
85 USD 150 billion
28 USD 150 billion
84 USD 150 billion

Minimum bid
rate
2.01%
2.02%
2.01%
1.94%
1.39%
1.11%
0.60%

Stop-out
rate

Amount bid

Bidcover
ratio

2.38%
2.67%
2.53%
3.75%
1.39%
1.11%
0.60%

USD 84 billion
USD 32 billion
USD 46 billion
USD 133 billion
USD 138 billion
USD 113 billion
USD 139 billion

1.12
1.27
1.85
1.78
0.92
0.76
0.93

Source: Fed and Runkel 2007–2010b.

6. Eligible Participants: An institution was eligible for the TAF if it was eligible for
primary credit at the discount window.
Depository institutions that were “eligible for primary credit—that is, those determined by
the lending Reserve Bank to be in generally sound financial condition”—were eligible to bid
at TAF auctions (Krieger 2007). The Fed determined eligibility for primary credit based on
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the bank’s most recent examination, which resulted in a CAMELS7 rating that the Fed could
access even when it was not a bank’s primary supervisor. The TAF, like the primary credit
facility, accepted CAMELS ratings of 1, 2, or 3, the highest ratings (Armantier, Krieger, and
McAndrews 2008). The Board considered and rejected a higher standard where a bank
would need to be “well capitalized but also well managed” to qualify for the TAF (FOMC and
Fed 2007b). However, such a standard would likely only have excluded a few banks.
Moreover, the FOMC was concerned that, by excluding banks from the TAF, the Fed would
inadvertently stigmatize them and worsen their liquidity problems (FOMC and Fed 2007b).
In total, 416 banks participated in the TAF. Their peak outstanding borrowings ranged from
USD 1.4 million for First Merchant Bank, to USD 60 billion for Bank of America (Fed 2007–
2010a).
7. Eligible Participants: US branches of foreign banks were eligible to participate in
the TAF.
The FOMC debated allowing US branches of foreign banks to participate in the TAF. Concern
centered around two points, (i) possible double-dipping, whereby such a branch would
borrow funds under the TAF while also benefitting from the Fed’s US dollar swaps with
various foreign central banks, and (ii) concern that the Fed could more accurately gauge
whether a US bank was creditworthy, as opposed to a branch of a foreign one (FOMC and
Fed 2007b).
The Board decided that US branches of foreign banks would be permitted to participate for
several reasons, but primarily because excluding them from the TAF would have constituted
“a huge change in” how the Fed treated foreign financial institutions (FOMC and Fed 2007b).
Moreover, many US banks also had foreign subsidiaries that could participate in other
central banks’ liquidity facilities, which put the US banks in a similar position with respect to
the possibility of double-dipping (FOMC and Fed 2007d).
Even with large liquidity swap lines, US branches of foreign banks borrowed 65% of all funds
auctioned under the TAF (Government Accountability Office 2011). Acharya, Afonso, and
Kovner (2013) argue that foreign banks with a presence in the US turned to the TAF because
it was the only large source of liquidity open to them. Foreign banks saw a smaller increase
in deposits than US banks, and foreign banks couldn’t access advances from the FHLB (see
Leonard 2022). Acharya, Afonso, and Kovner (2013) also connect foreign-bank liquidity
problems to the pre-TAF period, suggesting that the TAF put foreign banks and US banks on
more even footing to face the Global Financial Crisis. It is not clear how much of such funding
was used by US branches for their own funding needs compared to the funding needs of their
parents abroad.
No FOMC meeting transcripts going back to September 2007 mentioned opening eligibility
to primary dealers, which already had access to open-market operations. Further, the Fed
had, in 2007, already exempted specific banks from restrictions on funneling liquidity to
7 The CAMELS rating measured capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity

to market risk on a scale of 1 (the best) to 5 (the worst) (Armantier, Krieger, and McAndrews 2008).

1387

United States

Runkel and Chen

affiliated dealers (Omarova 2011). TAF recipients could, under this exemption, send funds
to their affiliates while borrowing from the program.
8. Funding Source: The Fed funded TAF loans by creating reserves.
Successful TAF bidders received credits in the accounts they held at their local Federal
Reserve bank (Fed 2008a).
9. Program Size: The Fed significantly increased the total program size and the
amount of individual auctions during the program’s duration.
The Fed increased the program total in response to market conditions. As shown in Figure
5, the TAF operated with a program total allocated across auctions held every two weeks.
When the term was limited to 28 days, this program total equaled the sum of the
authorizations of two consecutive auctions. Initially, the TAF was authorized to auction USD
20 billion every two weeks, for a total of USD 40 billion. Between December 2007 and April
2008, the amount offered for each auction increased to USD 75 billion, bringing the
program’s total authorization to USD 150 billion. When it added the 84-day loans in July and
began alternating between auctions of 28- and 84-day loans, it modified the amount offered
in 28-day auctions to maintain an authorized amount of USD 150 billion (Fed 2007–2010a;
Fed 2008f).
Figure 5: Total Authorizations and Offerings Per Auction for Selected Dates
Announcement Date
December 12, 2007
January 4, 2008
March 7, 2008
May 2, 2008
July 30, 2008

Total Authorized
USD 40 billion
USD 60 billion
USD 100 billion
USD 150 billion
USD 150 billion

September 29, 2008

USD 300 billion

October 6, 2008

USD 600 billion

June 25, 2009

none specified

July 24, 2009

none specified

August 28, 2009

none specified

September 24, 2009

none specified

Maturities Offered
28 days
28 days
28 days
28 days
28 days
84 days
28 days
84 days
28 days
84 days
28 days
84 days
28 days
84 days
28 days
84 days
28 days
70 days

Individual Auction Amount
USD 20 billion
USD 30 billion
USD 50 billion
USD 75 billion
USD 75 billion*
USD 25 billion
USD 25 billion
USD 75 billion
USD 150 billion
USD 150 billion
USD 125 billion
USD 125 billion
USD 100 billion
USD 100 billion
USD 75 billion
USD 75 billion
USD 75 billion
USD 50 billion

* Amounts varied to stay within authorized amount.
Sources: Fed 2008b; Fed 2008c; Fed 2008e; Fed 2008f; Fed 2008g; Fed 2009c; Fed 2009d; Fed 2009e; Fed 2009f.
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Every auction before October 2008 was oversubscribed—sometimes doubly so—which
pushed out some bidders. Oversubscribed auctions were part of the Fed’s stigma strategy,
since institutions could not ensure they would receive funds. The Lehman bankruptcy and
the failure of several other major US institutions re-prioritized the size of the TAF over its
effects on stigma. The Fed announced that, beginning with the October 6 auction, it would
triple the amount offered in its 84-day auction to USD 75 billion (increasing to a total of USD
225 billion in that maturity) while maintaining the 28-day auctions at USD 25 billion. The
Board said it was taking these steps to “reassure financial market participants that financing
will be available against good collateral, lessening concerns about funding and rollover risk”
(Fed 2008g). After total bids for the October 6 auction topped USD 130 billion, the Fed
increased the auction offer to USD 150 billion for that auction and future auctions of both the
28-day and 84-day maturities (Fed 2007–2010a; Fed 2008g).
These increased offerings were able to provide full allotment to all bidders, effectively
mirroring the strategy of the European Central Bank’s longer-term refinancing operations
(known as LTROs) (FOMC and Fed 2008c; Runkel 2022). Offering amounts remained at USD
150 billion until July 2009 (Fed 2007–2010a). The tumultuous period between August and
October 2008 is presented in Figure 4.
10. Individual Participation Limits: The maximum bid amount was 10% of the amount
offered, while the minimum bid was lowered from USD 10 million to USD 5 million.
The final terms for the TAF set the maximum bid amount, aggregated across all US branches
of a bank, to 10% of the amount offered (Fed 2008a; Fed and Runkel 2007–2010b). That is,
a bank with branches or affiliates in other Federal Reserve districts could only bid up to a
combined 10% of the total amount offered. The Fed’s original proposal was modeled on prior
auctions for Treasury securities, which had maximum bid sizes of 35% (Krieger 2007; FOMC
and Fed 2007b). Following this model, the Fed proposed a maximum bid amount of 20%, but
FOMC participants expressed concerns that five risky institutions would take the entire
allotment. This could cause political problems if the Fed was seen as propping up risky or
foreign institutions instead of American markets (FOMC and Fed 2007b).
The original design of the TAF required a minimum bid of USD 50 million. FOMC participants
expressed concerns that this would exclude small banks, giving large banks favorable
financing (FOMC and Fed 2007b). Before the first TAF operation was announced, the Fed
lowered the minimum bid to USD 10 million to accommodate “the desired bid sizes of
smaller institutions” (FOMC and Fed 2007c). The Fed applied the same logic when it lowered
the minimum bid to USD 5 million ahead of the February 11, 2008, operation (FOMC and Fed
2008a).
11. Rate Charged: Successful bidders paid the stop-out rate, subject to a minimum bid
rate.
The Fed chose to use a single-price auction to simplify settlement and encourage aggressive
bidding, since successful bidders paid the stop-out rate instead of the rate they bid
(Armantier, Krieger, and McAndrews 2008). See Key Design Decision No. 5, Administration,
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for more details on this. In this format, FRBNY compiled all bids and accepted them, starting
with the highest rates bid, until the sum requested by accepted bids exhausted the total
amount offered in the auction. Then, all bidders paid the single rate equal to the lowest
accepted bid.
Minimum bid rates were set by the Board of Governors prior to each auction announcement.
Originally the Fed used 10bps over the Overnight Index Swap (OIS)—which was
approximately the one-month federal funds rate8—as the minimum bid rate (FOMC and Fed
2007b). The LIBOR-OIS spread had widened, so the TAF would allow banks to borrow at a
rate above the OIS (to account for term and risk premia) but below the LIBOR, which had
risen to prohibitive levels. As one FOMC participant said, “You could actually criticize a bank
for not participating in this. They are somehow leaving money on the table by not taking
advantage of” these low interest rates, which could encourage perfectly healthy banks to bid
for funds (FOMC and Fed 2007b). With the amount of bidders—including healthy bidders—
that bid for TAF funds, all auctions that were undersubscribed settled at the minimum bid
rate.
But this low minimum created an arbitrage opportunity. By December 2008, the Fed had
begun paying 0.25% interest on excess reserve balances but the target federal funds rate had
dropped to between 0 and 0.25% (FOMC 2008). Banks could borrow from the TAF and then
lend the Fed its own money at a profit. To avoid such arbitrage, in January 2009 the Fed
switched the minimum bid rate from the OIS to the interest rate on reserve balances (Fed
2009b).
12. Eligible Collateral: The TAF used the discount window’s collateral procedures and
set of eligible assets but required larger amounts.
The discount window accepted a wide set of collateral, as shown in the Appendix. Like
discount-window borrowers, potential TAF borrowers had to deposit collateral with their
local Federal Reserve bank before borrowing, and such collateral was subject to haircuts—
shown in the Appendix—to determine a participant’s maximum bid. Because the Federal
Reserve bank staff regularly administered the discount window rules regarding collateral,
they could quickly and efficiently assess and value collateral deposited for TAF borrowings
and implement TAF auctions (FOMC and Fed 2007b). In practice, nominal collateral value
(i.e. before haircuts) averaged 513% of loan value. As shown in Figure 6, borrowers pledged
large amounts of commercial loans, asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities, and
residential mortgages. On the other hand, borrowers pledged small amounts of their safest
assets: US Treasury bills and government bonds (Fed 2007–2010a).

Banks with reserves in excess of Fed requirements lent to other banks overnight in the federal funds market;
the Fed’s target for that rate was one of its key monetary policy tools.
8
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Figure 6: Portion of Collateral Pledged by Asset Class

Source: Fed 2007–2010a.

TAF required a collateral cushion on top of the standard haircuts. Originally, participants had
to provide double the collateral normally required, but were only required to maintain that
collateral for the term of the bidding process. This ensured borrowers some flexibility if they
incurred overdrafts before settlement. The Fed did not apply the same cushion to term
discount-window loans (FOMC and Fed 2008b).
In July 2008, when the Fed added 84-day loans, it decreased the size of the collateral cushion
to 33% of the collateral value. In doing so, the Fed also required the cushion to remain on
deposit for the term of the loan after it learned that some banks withdrew the collateral
cushion after being awarded the TAF loan (FOMC and Fed 2008b; Fed 2008a). At the same
time, the Fed stipulated that term discount-window loans would also bear the same cushion
requirement. If the collateral value on deposit fell below 133% of the loan value, the
borrowing bank was required to cover the shortfall within two business days (Fed 2009a).
If it did not, the Reserve Bank could exercise its rights to recourse (Government
Accountability Office 2011). The Fed also considered revising their haircut schedule but
demurred after considering possible negative market consequences (FOMC and Fed 2008b).
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13. Loan Duration: The TAF initially only auctioned 28-day loans. On July 30, 2008,
the TAF added 84-day loans.
The TAF initially only auctioned 28-day loans to backstop the interbank term lending
market. Fed staff research connected the collapse of mortgage-backed and asset-backed
products with increases in bid-ask spreads for term funding, specifically in one-month terms
(FOMC and Fed 2007b). Setting the term at 28 days allowed the Fed to conduct auctions on
the same weekday without increasing the program’s total authorization. It also brought the
maturity of the new facility close to the maximum term on discount-window loans.
In March 2008, the Federal Reserve Board extended the maximum term of discount-window
loans from 30 to 90 days, amongst a package of measures following the near-failure of Bear
Stearns (Fed 2008d). In July, the Fed extended the maximum term of TAF loans to 84 days.
New York Fed President William Dudley explained:
The motivation for the maturity extension is to provide greater support to term funding
markets. For some time, banks have asked for longer-term maturity TAF loans. This is
attractive to them for two reasons: (1) almost all of these loans will extend over quarterends—periods in which balance sheet stress is likely to be greatest—and (2) the longer
maturity would also help banks extend the average maturity of their borrowings. This
change will also put the maturity of TAF loans more on par with the ninety-day limit of
the primary credit facility (FOMC and Fed 2008b, 5).
In July 2008, when Fed staff originally proposed extending the term of all TAF loans to 84
days, FOMC participants expressed concerns over increased credit risk to the Reserve Banks.
These concerns ultimately led to the increased collateralization requirements discussed in
Key Design Decision Error! Reference source not found., but FOMC participants discussed
augmenting the supervisory information that Reserve Banks had with information from
other regulators as an alternative way of limiting credit risk in 84-day loans. Though
Armantier, Krieger, and McAndrews (2008) noted that the Fed may hold an informational
advantage over the creditworthiness of banks in crisis due to its access to information about
a bank’s fundamentals, FOMC officials were concerned about how risks increased with the
length of maturity. FOMC participants expressed fears over fully relying on other regulators
to assess banks after the FDIC failed to alert the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco of the
health of an institution it nearly accepted for primary credit (FOMC and Fed 2008b).
With the introduction of the 84-day loans, the Fed continued biweekly TAF auctions but
alternated between offering 28-loans and 84-day loans. It maintained the amount of liquidity
outstanding at USD 150 billion—divided equally between the two maturities—until October
2008 when it significantly increased the size of the 28-day and 84-day loan auctions (Fed
2008f; FOMC and Fed 2008b). TAF loans of any term could not be paid off before maturity
(Fed 2009a). TAF funds of 28- and 84-day duration aligned with reserve maintenance
periods, over which the Fed calculated whether banks met the regulatory reserve
requirement; periods began on a Thursday and ended two Wednesdays later.
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14. Other Conditions: The TAF imposed no other conditions on bidders.
Documents surveyed do not indicate further restrictions on bidders.
15. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: The Fed sterilized TAF funds by selling
Treasury securities and conducting auctions rather than using a standing facility.
The Fed chose an auction in part because it allowed the Fed to control when and how much
it increased the supply of reserve balances (FOMC and Fed 2007c). By prohibiting early
repayment and using fixed-term loans that were not subject to the rollover risks associated
with discount-window lending, the Fed could also control when and how much it decreased
the supply of reserves when TAF loans matured. This let the open-market desk face “minimal
uncertainty” about the TAF’s effects on monetary policy implementation (Mishkin 2008). For
example, to offset the injection of USD 75 billion of reserves into the financial system in the
form of TAF loans, FRBNY could sell USD 75 billion of Treasury securities through its openmarket operations to sterilize the increase in reserves (Government Accountability Office
2011). To further influence reserve balances, the Fed set the minimum bid rate equal to the
rate offered for interest on excess reserves (see Key Design Decision No. Error! Reference
source not found., Rate Charged).
16. Other Options: The Fed chose an auction format after changes to the discount
window failed to stimulate borrowing.
Before the TAF was authorized in December 2007, the Fed announced changes to make the
discount window more attractive. In August, the Board reduced the penalty on discountwindow loans—represented by the spread between the primary credit rate at the discount
window and the federal funds rate—from 100bps to 50bps. It also extended the possible
length of discount-window loans to 30 days plus a possible renewal (Armantier, Krieger, and
McAndrews 2008). In March 2008, before the introduction of 84-day TAF funds, the Fed
extended the possible length of discount-window loans to 90 days (Fed 2008d). Discountwindow usage did not increase appreciably after these changes despite continued tightening
in the interbank market (Fed 2007c).
In debating the TAF on December 6, FOMC participants also considered two alternatives:
further reducing the discount-window penalty; or, adopting a term credit program that
would allow banks to request credit at the discount window. Fed staff argued that the auction
had several advantages. First, the TAF allowed the Fed to strictly control how much it
increased the supply of reserve balances, whereas the discount window largely allows banks
to determine how much they borrow. Second, an auction included several features that
promised to reduce stigma over standing facilities. Third, by releasing funds at discrete
intervals, the Fed could monitor if and how the auctions changed market conditions and
respond before the next auction. A temporary TAF could also allow the Fed to explore the
possibility of a permanent term auction credit facility (FOMC and Fed 2007c).
FOMC participants also raised the possibility of cutting discount-window borrowing rates
and operating-term repurchases that covered only the end of 2007. They doubted the ability
of the TAF to relieve pressure in ways that the FHLB and discount window had not. Further,
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they wondered if the interbank market would quickly find a new equilibrium. But the Fed
had received interest in the TAF from other central banks, and Chair Bernanke noted that
they “were not interested, explicitly, in participating if we were involving only a discount
rate cut or any other action” (FOMC and Fed 2007c).
17. Similar Programs in Other Countries: The Bank of England revised its standing
lending facility due to stigma, and the ECB expanded the range of maturities it
offered.
Many central banks expanded term-lending programs and at least one addressed stigma, but
no other central bank successfully combined the two. In 2008, the Bank of England split its
standing facility into two new standing facilities due to stigma. The Discount Window Facility
(DWF) was most similar to the TAF, offering banks loans of up to 30 days (later increased to
364 days). Banks pre-positioned more than £265 billion of collateral with the DWF, but the
facility was not used (Fulmer 2022).
As shown in Figure 7, large central banks used long-term open-market operations to combat
the GFC, though only the DWF and TAF sought to overcome stigma issues (Borio and Nelson
2008). The Eurosystem, headed by the European Central Bank, expanded its term
refinancing operations in both allotment and maturities. These operations used a multi-rate
auction until October 2008, when it satisfied all bids at a policy rate. The term refinancing
saw similar usage as the TAF, with more than €700 billion outstanding at their peak (Runkel
2022).
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Figure 2: Comparison of Crisis Policy Changes

Note: The headers denote countries surveyed and are, from left to right, Australia, Canada, the eurozone/euro
area, Japan, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.
Source: Borio and Nelson 2008.

18. Communication: The Fed coordinated some policy announcements with foreign
central banks and, overall, increased their communication.
Market participants anticipated that the Fed would create a facility aimed at the interbank
market. When the Fed did not announce such a facility in the December 11 statement
following its meeting, stocks slumped. But the Fed had been waiting to announce the TAF
simultaneously with the central banks of England, Japan, Canada, the ECB, and the SNB. The
Fed chair wrote that the ECB had requested participating central banks announce the
currency lines and TAF simultaneously to emphasize their coordination rather than
emphasizing the one-sidedness of dollars flowing from the Fed abroad (Bernanke 2015,
184). On December 12, 2007, the central banks of the UK, Japan, the eurozone, Canada, and
Switzerland joined the Fed in announcing measures to increase liquidity (BoC 2007; Bank of
England 2007). For the ECB and SNB, these announcements included the dollar swap lines
and auctions (ECB 2007; SNB 2007). Later, these central banks would follow the TAF’s lead
and announce 84-day US-dollar loans (FOMC and Fed 2008b).
Bernanke (2015, 185) recognized the announcement of the TAF as the start of increased
communication from the Fed. By doing so, the Fed intended to enlarge its role as a
communicator and influence market reactions more frequently.
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19. Disclosure: The Fed publicized the auction parameters and disclosed auction
results, but did not disclose identifiable, loan-level data until after the TAF
expired.
The Fed released aggregated results of each auction the following day. These notices
included the amount awarded, the number of bidders, the stop-out rate, and the bid-to-cover
ratio (Fed and Runkel 2007–2010b). Also, each Wednesday the Fed published outstanding
TAF and discount-window loans in each Fed region, a practice it had long done for discountwindow loans prior to the crisis (Fed 2007c).
The Fed did not release data about specific institutions and told banks that it would not
release such data, “except as required by law” (Fed 2009a). Institutional data regarding TAF
borrowings was only released in December 2010 after Bloomberg LP brought a Freedom of
Information Act challenge against the Fed (Bloomberg L.P. v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System 2009). The Fed then released data specifying institution, borrowing
amount, and collateral supplied (Fed 2007–2010a). This disclosure revealed the heavy usage
of the TAF by US branches of foreign banks.
20. Stigma Strategy: The TAF eliminated the first-mover disadvantage of the discount
window and delayed settlement.
The TAF’s single-price auction format introduced several features to combat the discount
window’s stigma. Since the Fed discouraged use of the facility throughout the 20th century,
market participants began to view credit from Federal Reserve banks, which “in normal
times is rare . . . as a sign of weakness” (Duke 2010; Armantier, Lee, and Sarkar 2015). Though
discount-window loans were ostensibly confidential, banks could triangulate the borrower
based on the size of the loan, the district, and information gathered from colleagues and
friends at other banks (Duke 2010; Armantier et al. 2015). Knowing—or suspecting—that a
bank borrowed from the discount window damaged a bank’s chances at securing private
financing “as the market trie[d] to identify the weaker players” (Duke 2010).
TAF auctions did not give market participants this sort of knowledge. Since loans settled
simultaneously, no bank could be singled out if multiple banks received funds. And, as long
as demand was sufficiently high, the maximum bid amount meant that at least ten banks per
auction received funds. The Fed stimulated demand by setting the minimum price below
LIBOR and the federal funds rate. This feature attacked the view that participating banks
were distressed, since “banks would not necessarily signal an abnormally high demand by
bidding” (FOMC and Fed 2007b; Armantier, Krieger, and McAndrews 2008). Moreover,
distressed banks couldn’t rely on the TAF since some bidders did not win funds, and loans
settled three days after the auction (Mishkin 2008).
21. Exit Strategy: The FOMC cited continuing improvements in the economy when it
announced on January 27, 2010, the last TAF auctions.
Early discussions of the TAF left open the possibility that it could become a permanent
facility (Mishkin 2008; FOMC and Fed 2007c). Unlike most of the Federal Reserve’s other
programs, the TAF did not have an end date and could, legally, continue regardless of
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whether the financial system faced “unusual and exigent circumstances” (FOMC and Fed
2009a). However, by December 2008, FOMC transcripts show that members were anxious
about the growing size of the Fed’s balance sheet. Nonetheless, while Fed staff believed the
TAF “should downsize pretty automatically” as participants stopped seeking funds in favor
of lower alternatives and more flexibility (FOMC and Fed 2008d). By summer 2009, TAF
auctions had decreased but still provided tens of billions of dollars in liquidity per operation
(Fed and Runkel 2007–2010b). In its September 2009 meeting, Fed staff first proposed a
gradual reduction in offering amounts (FOMC and Fed 2009a). The Fed decided then to phase
out 84-day auctions by shortening the maturities first to 70 days, and then removing credit
longer than 28 days altogether (FOMC and Fed 2009b). On January 27, 2010, the FOMC
announced the wind-down of several GFC programs including the TAF, specifying the final
two amounts offered (USD 50 billion and USD 25 billion) and dates (February 8 and March
8) when they also raised the minimum bid rate (FOMC 2010).
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Appendix
Federal Reserve Haircut Schedule
Securities or
Instruments with
Market Prices
(% of Market Value)
Collateral Category

US Treasuries and Fully
Guaranteed Agencies:
Bills,
Notes,
Bonds,
Inflation Indexes
Zero Coupons, STRIPS
Government Sponsored
Enterprises:
Bills,
Notes,
Bonds,
Inflation Indexes
Zero Coupons, STRIPS
International Agencies:
Bills, Notes, Bonds - US
Dollar Denominated
Bills, Notes, Bonds - AAA
- Foreign Denominated
Zero Coupons, STRIPS
Brady Bonds- US Dollar
Denominated
Brady Bonds - Foreign
Denominated
Foreign Governments US Dollar Denominated
Foreign Governments Foreign Denominated
Foreign
Government
Agencies - US Dollar
Denominated
Foreign
Government
Agencies - AAA - Foreign
Denominated
Municipal Bonds - US
Dollar Denominated
Municipal Bonds - AAA Foreign Denominated

Duration Buckets
0 to
5

>5 to
10

>10

98%

97%

93%

98%

95%

90%

97%

96%

92%

96%

94%

89%

97%

95%

93%

92%

90%

85%

94%

92%

86%

95%

92%

88%

90%

87%

83%

97%

95%

90%

92%

90%

85%

97%

95%

90%

92%

90%

85%

97%

95%

92%

90%

85%

80%

Securities or
Instruments if
Market Price
Not Available
(% of Par or
Outstanding
Balance)
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90%

85%

80%

60%

75%

75%

75%

Loans
Deposited
at FRS
(% of
Market
Value)

Loans Not
Deposited
at FRS
(% of
Outstanding
Balance)

United States

Corporate Bonds - US
Dollar Denominated
Corporate Bonds - AAA Foreign Denominated
German
Jumbo
Pfandbriefe - AAA - US
Dollar Denominated
German
Jumbo
Pfandbriefe - AAA Foreign Denominated
Asset-Backed Securities AAA
(includes
Collateralized Loan and
Debt Obligations)
Asset-Backed Securities non
AAA
(excludes
Collateralized Loan and
Debt Obligations)
Commercial MortgageBacked Securities - AAA
Mortgage
Backed
Securities
(includes
agency and private label)
Collateralized Mortgage
Obligations
AAA
(includes agency and
private label)
Trust
Preferred
Securities
Mutual Funds (tcuux,
tcudx, tcuxx)
Government Sponsored
Enterprise Stock (FNMA,
FHLM)
Bankers
Acceptances,
Certificates of Deposit,
and Commercial Paper
Commercial
and
Agricultural Loans:
Minimal Risk Rated
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97%

95%

93%

80%

92%

90%

85%

96%

92%

90%

92%

90%

85%

98%

96%

93%

85%

97%

95%

92%

80%

97%

95%

92%

80%

98%

96%

93%

90%

97%

95%

92%

80%

94%

92%

90%

70%

60%

90%
87%
97%

95%

Normal Risk Rated
Agency
Guaranteed
Loans
Commercial Real Estate
Loans
Construction Real Estate
Loans
1-4 Family Residential
Mortgages
Home Equity
Consumer Loans - Autos,
Private
Banking,
Installment, Etc.
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90%

80%

87%

75%

93%

90%

87%

75%

87%

75%

91%

85%

89%

85%

87%

80%
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Consumer Loans - Credit
Card
Receivables,
Student Loans
Consumer
Loans
SubPrime Credit Card
Receivables
Source: Federal Reserve System 2006.

75%
60%
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